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We often have some reason to do actions insofar as they promote outcomes or states of
affairs. But what is it to promote an outcome? I defend a new version of ‘probabilism
about promotion’. According to Minimal Probabilistic Promotion, we promote some
outcome when we make that outcome more likely than it would have been if we had
done something (anything) else. This makes promotion easy and reasons cheap.
Many theories of reasons can tell us which outcomes or states of affairs wehave practical (normative) reasons to bring about. Some theories, for
example, say that we have reason to bring about those states in which well-being
or the satisfaction of our desires is maximised.
But telling us which outcome to bring about doesn’t yet tell us what to do.
Let’s suppose that Rhys has a reason—of whatever sort—to obtain a nice new
bike. Tomorrow, a fair raffle will be drawn. A raffle is a lottery where each ticket
has a unique number, and all 500 tickets will be sold, though none has yet been
sold. Rhys is first in line to buy tickets. The prize is a nice new bike. Setting aside
tedious stipulations and complications, we can say that Rhys has some reason to
win the raffle and thus the bike.
Let’s focus only on this reason. Again given some stipulations, if Rhys buys n
tickets, then the probability that he wins the bike is n/500. We can see that he has
a reason to buy all of the tickets—he has a reason to get the bike, and if he buys
all of the tickets, then he’ll get the bike. Similarly, he has no reason (that we are
focusing on) to buy none of the tickets—the only reason we are discussing is his
reason to get the bike, and if he buys no tickets, then he won’t get the bike.
But what about the intermediate actions, buying somewhere between 1 and
499 tickets? The upshot of these actions is non-trivially chancy or otherwise
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probabilistic. All we have said so far is silent about such actions. It seems clear
that Rhys’s reason to get the new bike gives him some practical reason to buy
more tickets rather than fewer: the more tickets he buys, the more likely it is that
he gets the bike. He has most reason to buy all the tickets. He might of course
have countervailing reasons to buy fewer tickets, but those are not our focus. To
capture his reason for buying (say) 50 tickets, we need a theory of how reasons
to bring about a state of affairs (Rhys wins a bike) engender reasons to do some
action (buying 50 raffle tickets).
Somewhat stipulatively, let’s say that his buying more rather than fewer tickets
promotes the outcome that he wins the bike. And increasingly so, as he buys more
rather than fewer. A theory of promotion tells us which actions you have some
reason to do, and the relative strengths of those reasons: it gets us from reasons to
bring about certain states of affairs, to reasons for particular actions.1 Promotion
tells us how much rational support there is for many actions (such as buying 257
raffle tickets).
This is not just a side issue. Philippa Foot famously claimed that ‘irrational
actions are those in which a man in some way defeats his own purposes, doing
what is calculated to be disadvantageous or to frustrate his ends’ (1972: 310). But
if his end is that some outcome or state of affairs obtains, then which actions
frustrate or defeat that end, and why? And which actions promote or guarantee
that end?
This normative conception of promotion underlies my methodology. Promo-
tion is, I claim, implicitly defined by two fairly obvious claims about promotion’s
connection to practical reasons.
The first claim is:
Absolute Reason-Promote. If S has a reason to bring about an outcome D,
then: there is a promotional reason for S to A iff S’s A-ing would promote
D.2
Absolute Reason-Promote concerns contributory (or ‘pro tanto’) reasons, which
count for or against some action (Dancy 2004: esp. 16–17). In particular, this
principle says nothing about the strengths of the various reasons. An account of
promotion that satisfies Absolute Reason-Promote will tell us which of Rhys’s
possible actions would promote the outcome that he wins the bike, and so which
actions he has a reason to do. But it won’t tell us which actions he has more
reason to do than others (other than perhaps in trivial cases where there is no
reason to A, and some reason to B).
1. An at-least-similar distinction crops up in many places, such as that between utility and
expected utility.
2. Snedegar (2014: 46) defends a version of Absolute Reason-Promote, which he simply
calls ‘Promote’.
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The second claim is:
Degree Reason-Promote. If S has a reason to bring about an outcome D,
then: there is more promotional reason for S to A than to B iff S’s A-ing
would promote D to a greater degree than her B-ing would.
Degree Reason-Promote concerns comparisons between actions, in terms of how
much reason there is to do them. In Dancy’s terminology, it is verdictive, in that it
concerns verdicts about the balance of reasons or rational permissibility, such as
that ‘we have more reason to do this than to do that, but most reason to do some
third thing’ (2004: esp. 16–17). Intuitively, we want our account of promotion
to tell us that Rhys buying 400 raffle tickets promotes his winning the bike to a
greater degree than his buying 300 tickets does. This will vindicate the thought
that he has more reason to do the former than the latter.
My task in what follows is to find an account of promotion which can play
its role in Absolute Reason-Promote and Degree Reason-Promote. Both of these
principles are restricted to ‘promotional’ reasons: reasons which are grounded in
the promotion of outcomes or states of affairs. I do not assume that all reasons
are promotional, but since they are the topic of this paper, I will largely omit the
qualifier.
‘Promote’ is a relatively commonplace word in English, and we might hope
for an account of promotion that is at least recognisably similar to its everyday
meaning. But my implicit-definition methodology could take us quite far from
this everyday sense, since I’ll be—via the two Reason-Promote principles—relying
on claims about which reasons there are. I don’t think this need be a problem,
since there’s little pressure to think that ‘promote’ is totally univocal, and we
shouldn’t be afraid to depart from the everyday in search of a good account of
the normative. I’ll argue that the best theory of our everyday talk of promotion
and the best normative theory of promotion are recognisably similar, but they do
differ in the details.
Except in one explicitly-marked case (in §7.1), I am concerned throughout
with cases where there is only one outcome that provides or grounds promotional
reasons. Stipulatively, the only outcome an agent S has some reason to bring
about is D. So when I write, for example, that S has stronger reason to A than to
B, this means that she has stronger reason to A than to B in virtue of having reason
to bring about the outcome D.
Finally, often the outcome or state of affairs to be promoted is the satisfaction
of a desire (and I will often write ‘promote a desire’ rather than ‘promote the
satisfaction of a desire’ or ‘promote the outcome or state of affairs in which a
desire is satisfied’). But the discussion is intended to be fully general.
Cases such as the raffle tend to support ‘probabilism about promotion’, which
says that to promote an outcome or state of affairs simply is to raise its probability.
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Rhys has practical reasons to take actions—such as buying more tickets—that
increase the probability that he wins the bike. Moreover, at least the way I
presented it, promotion only became an issue when we made the upshot of
actions probabilistic.
In this paper, I’ll defend a new probabilist theory of promotion.
1. Probabilism and its Discontents
Probabilism is extremely intuitive, but has proved much easier to state as a general
thesis than to defend in detail. Here it is in barebones terms:
Probabilism about Promotion. An agent S’s action A promotes the out-
come D iff p(D|A) > X.
As Jeff Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo have argued, a probabilist needs two things.
The first is an interpretation of the probabilities involved (Behrends & DiPaolo
2016). I won’t discuss this question, but will simply talk of ‘probabilities’, where
these should be understood as objective chances or some highly idealised cre-
dences.
The second requirement—the baseline, X—has proven more troubling. Pro-
motion involves increasing the probability of an outcome. But compared to what?
Each proposed baseline faces apparent counterexamples, many of which descend
from cases described by Behrends and DiPaolo (2011).3 Without a baseline—which
will allow us to say whether promotion is occurring—we cannot fill in Absolute
Reason-Promote.
Mark Schroeder influentially suggested that the baseline is the probability of
D conditional on the agent ‘doing nothing—conditional on the status quo’ (2007:
113). Here is probabilism with a ‘do nothing’ baseline:
Do Nothing. S’s A-ing promotes D iff p(D|A) > p(D|S does nothing).
(I discuss the status quo below.) Evers (2009: esp. 60) makes two important
criticisms of Do Nothing. First, it’s not especially clear what ‘doing nothing’
amounts to. The same (in)action might variously be described as doing nothing,
standing firm, being patient, and so on. I don’t think this criticism need be
decisive: perhaps imprecision or ambiguity in ‘doing nothing’ is reflected in our
reasons.
But the second criticism is rather more worrying: according to Do Nothing,
there can never be a reason to do nothing. The probability of a given outcome
3. For accounts of promotion and further counterexamples, see, e.g., Coates (2013), Sharadin
(2015), Manne (2016), and Lin (2018).
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conditional on you doing nothing would have to exceed the probability of that
outcome conditional on you doing nothing. But that is clearly not going to happen.
And intuitively, we can have a reason to do nothing: if I tell you that you will
receive £1000 if you do nothing for ten minutes, but won’t get any money if you
do any (positive) action during that ten minutes, it’s at least extremely plausible
that this is a reason for you to do nothing for ten minutes (cf. Behrends & DiPaolo
2011: 4ff.).
This is an instance of a general problem for accounts of promotion, which I’ll
call the sticky baseline: since promotion involves exceeding some baseline, there
can be no reason to merely reach the baseline, or to remain there. Much discussion
of promotion consists of stickiness objections to proposed baselines.
The claim that we can never have a reason to do nothing is counterintuitive—
though we might get pushed into it by the failure of alternatives. Later, I’ll suggest
that Do Nothing has something to be said in its favour, especially as an account
of our ordinary talk of promotion.
So what alternatives are there? Many of the most important proposed base-
lines are what I’ll call disposition-sensitive: whether S’s A-ing promotes D depends
on S’s dispositions to act. For example, Finlay (2006: 8 fn. 19) proposes that you
promote an outcome by some action if the outcome is more probable given that
action, than it would have been if you hadn’t done that action:4
Finlay’s Counterfactual Baseline. S’s A-ing promotes D iff p(D|A) >
p(D|¬A).
This baseline is intuitive: if some outcome is more likely if I buy a ticket than if
I don’t buy a ticket, then surely in buying a ticket I promote that outcome? But
here is an apparent counterexample—another instance of the sticky baseline:
Buttons. Debbie has some desire. There are three buttons in front of her.
If she pushes either button A or button B, her desire is guaranteed to be
fulfilled. If she pushes button C or does nothing, her desire will not be
fulfilled. Debbie in fact pushes A. Had she not pushed A, though, she
would have pushed B instead.5
Let’s suppose that—as seems clear—in pushing A, Debbie does promote the
satisfaction of her desire.
Finlay’s baseline p(D|¬A) is disposition-sensitive. This baseline’s verdict
depends on what would (probably) have happened had Debbie not pushed A,
4. Following Behrends and DiPaolo (2011: 1 fn. 1), I’ll interpret Finlay’s ‘is conducive to’ in
terms of promotion.
5. Adapted from Behrends and DiPaolo (2011: 2). I have adapted the case by explicitly
clarifying what happens if Debbie does nothing.
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including what Debbie would (probably) have done instead. The core idea of
Buttons is to rig this baseline, by stipulating that had Debbie not pushed A, then
she would have pushed B, and her desire would have been satisfied anyway. So
Debbie’s desire is not more likely to be satisfied if she pushes A than if she does
not push A.
Buttons has structured much of the promotion literature. Finding a plausible
baseline which vindicates the intuitive verdict—that Debbie promotes her desire—
has proven surprisingly troublesome.
Another influential baseline proposal is Schroeder’s status quo. But how to
understand this baseline in probabilistic terms? Most naturally, as the current
or antecedent probability of D. David Sobel interprets Schroeder this way—‘a
desire for p explains a reason to A iff A-ing makes p more likely than it already
is’ (Sobel 2016a: 305)—and Eden Lin has recently argued that a version of this
view may be defensible:
Simple Probabilistic Promotion (SPP). S’s doing A promotes D iff it
makes D more likely to obtain than it was prior to the occurrence of A.
(Lin 2018: 363)
SPP says that one promotes D by causing (making) an increase in the probability
of D. If p0(·) describes the probabilities before S acts, and p1(·) describes them
after she acts, then D is promoted by her action only if p1(D) > p0(D). (Not ‘if
and only if’, because the probability could have changed without S causing that
change.)
In Buttons, Debbie wouldn’t have pushed C, had she not pushed A (she would
have pushed B instead). But, as Lin (2018: 367) argues, beyond this counterfactual
claim, the case is underspecified: was there any probability that Debbie would
push C, had she not pushed A? If there was No Probability that she would, then
p0(C) = 0 and D was antecedently certain. So p0(D) = 1 = p1(D), and SPP says
that Debbie’s pushing A did not promote D. But if there was Some Probability
that she would, then p0(D) < 1 but p1(D) = 1, so according to SPP, Debbie’s
A-ing promoted her desire. Lin claims that both of these verdicts are correct.
Thus, SPP is disposition-sensitive, because whether pushing A promoted
Debbie’s desire depended on this counterfactual probability, which is in part
determined by Debbie’s propensities to act. But, I’ll argue, here lies the problem
for SPP. Between the No and Some Probability versions of the case, the only
difference lies in Debbie’s dispositions to act (let’s suppose). Nothing about her
desire that D, or the causal consequences of pushing each button, changes. Yet
whether pushing A promotes D—in other words, whether she has a reason to
push A—does change, according to SPP.
To see the implausibility of this, let’s set aside button B and doing nothing,
and consider a version of the case where the only buttons are A and C. Call this
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case Two Buttons.
SPP says that Debbie has a reason to push A if and only if p0(A) < 1. This
antecedent probability can be arbitrarily close to 1, and Debbie has a reason
to push A. But if p0(A) = 1, then p0(D) = p1(D) and her reason to push A
evaporates. Simply by altering Debbie’s dispositions to act, we can make her
reason evaporate. Thus according to SPP, there can never be a situation where the
causal upshot of A is certain, S has a promotional reason to A, and S is certain to
act in accordance with that reason. Reasons are ephemeral—such probabilistic
certainty dissolves the reason—which ironically undermines the possibility of
giving a normative explanation for why the agent was certain to act as such: we
cannot say that it was because she was certain to act in accord with that reason.
Lin of course sees the problem of cases where ‘p will obtain if and only if
you do A, and there is a probability of 1 that p will obtain because there is a
probability of 1 that you will do A’ (2018: 377). Intuitively, such an agent would
have a reason; SPP cannot say this. His response is that it is unclear whether
there are any such cases. But this response is unsatisfying: stipulated cases are
common in this dialectic, and such a case is no more artificial than Buttons with
No Probability. The stipulated probability is not so odd or distorted that the case
can be dismissed as not probative. And the problem extends beyond cases where
the causal upshot of A-ing is certain: if p0(D|A) = 0.7, and Sarah is certain to
push button A, then p0(D) = p1(D) = 0.7, and so her pushing button A doesn’t
promote D.
What I’ll call ‘three-action cases’ illustrate a general problem with disposition-
sensitive accounts.6 Suppose that Rhys could buy ten raffle tickets, or one, or
none. He currently has none. Does buying one ticket promote his goal of winning
the bike? Intuitively, yes. According to Do Nothing (which is not disposition-
sensitive), yes.
According to SPP, we don’t yet know whether it does. If Rhys was antecedently
very likely to buy no tickets, then buying one ticket promotes the outcome; if he
was antecedently very likely to buy ten tickets, then buying one ticket doesn’t
promote the outcome. According to SPP, whether an agent has a promotional
reason to do some action depends on which actions are available to him, what the
consequences would be of each action, and how likely he is to do each action. But
the last of these seems just plain irrelevant. Lin (2018: 377–378) argues that such
cases need not be a decisive objection to SPP—it may be worth biting the bullet if
a convincing account of reasons can be built around the view.
On the other hand, many contrastivists—who reject the existence of an in-
variant baseline—take the opposite lesson from such cases. For Snedegar and
Nathaniel Sharadin and Finnur Dellsén, three-action cases refute disposition-
sensitive accounts—though they do not put things in those terms—and motivate
6. See also Lin (2018: 377–378) and Snedegar (2017: 74 n. 18) for such cases.
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a move away from an invariant baseline, to contrastivism.7
I wish to steer a middle course. Three-action cases are a problem for in-
variantism, and cannot simply be ignored, but don’t yet push us towards con-
trastivism, which has its own problems.
In fact, a last-ditch defence can be made on behalf of SPP. Let’s appeal to
the distinction between the contributory and the verdictive, and extend SPP to
include dis-promotion, and associated reasons against actions:
Dis-Promotion for SPP. S’s doing A dis-promotes D if and only if it makes
D less likely to obtain than it was prior to the occurrence of A.
Absolute-Reason-Against-Promote. There is a reason against A-ing if and
only if A dis-promotes D.
Putting these claims together, in No Probability Buttons, pushing A doesn’t
promote D, and Debbie has no reason to push A. But pushing C would dis-
promote D, and so she has a reason against pushing C. So she has no reason
either for or against pushing A. But she does have a reason against pushing C.
From these contributory claims, a verdictive implication seems undeniable: of
the two buttons, she has most reason to push A, and least reason to push C; she
ought (of most reason) push A, and she ought not push C. SPP can thus rescue
the verdictive claim that Debbie has most reason to push A. But we must still
accept the implausible contributory upshot that she does not have a reason to
push A, even though pushing A will ensure the satisfaction of her desire.
The strategy can be applied to three-action cases. Of the three options, Rhys
has most reason to buy ten tickets, and least reason to buy none. He has some
intermediate amount of reason to buy just one ticket. His dispositions may
determine the contributory reasons for and against each action, but they are
irrelevant to the verdictive claims.
This defence is, however, not worth the price of such ephemerality of contrib-
utory reasons. Ephemerality highlights a philosophical tension in disposition-
sensitive accounts. On the one hand, there are genuine contributory reasons
for and against actions—if not, why specify a baseline?—but on the other, these
reasons are ephemeral, and depend on how the agent is disposed to act. If we
are in the business of providing an invariant baseline, and so dealing with non-
contrastive contributory reasons, we should look for a baseline that doesn’t lead
to such ephemerality.
I have argued against disposition-sensitive accounts, especially SPP. But SPP
has manifest intuitive plausibility. What could be more natural than saying
that to promote an outcome is to make it more probable than it already is?
7. I discuss contrastivism further in Section 2.1.
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Ultimately, however, the forward-looking nature of probabilities undermines this
plausibility. Because the antecedent probability of D is in part determined by the
future, including perhaps the fact that an agent S will ensure that D obtains, it is
unsuitable as a baseline for determining whether S’s actions promote D.
I’ve argued that each of the proposed probabilistic baselines succumbs to the
problem of the sticky baseline. As a preview for later, I’ll say that if we make the
baseline as low as is reasonably possible, its stickiness is no longer a problem. The
baseline will be so low—and hence promotion so cheap—that we will (almost)
never have cause to say that though some action intuitively promotes an outcome,
the baseline fails to respect this.
Of course, one lesson that could be be drawn from the problems with SPP
and the other probabilistic baselines is that probabilism is misguided. I’ll now
consider and reject a recent non-probabilist account of promotion.
2. Promotion as Fit
Consider impossible desires. These are desires whose probability of satisfaction
is zero, where that probability cannot be raised above zero. (As I’ll argue below,
these two claims do not quite amount to the same thing.) Probabilism about
promotion says that an outcome can be promoted only if its probability can be
raised against some baseline. Probabilism implies that impossible desires cannot
be promoted, because their probabilities cannot be raised at all. So impossible
desires can’t ground (promotional) reasons.
In a series of papers, Nathaniel Sharadin argues that an outcome can be pro-
moted even if its probability cannot be changed.8 If this is right, then probabilism
is false. Sharadin and Dellsén argue instead that promoting a desire is a matter
of increasing the fit between the world and that desire, where fit is the ‘match
between the desire’s content and the way the world is’ (2019: 1277). The fit
account allows for the promotion of impossible desires insofar as the actual world
can be made to more closely (albeit partially) fit such a desire’s content.
There are two issues here—the promote-the-impossible attack on probabilism,
and the fit account in particular—but they are obviously connected. The apparent
promotion of impossible desires is at the heart of both. After spelling out the
Contrastive Expected Fit view in more detail, I’ll argue that we cannot promote
impossible desires, and offer some criticisms of the fit view.9
8. See, for example, Sharadin (2015) and Sharadin (2016).
9. My notation differs slightly from that of Sharadin and Dellsén, to be more consistent
with the rest of this paper.
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2.1. Contrastive Expected Fit
Sharadin and Dellsén give the fit relation an almost entirely intuitive characterisa-
tion, together with a few examples. The intuition is fairly clear: some possible
worlds fit (a desire that) D better than others do, and some pairs of worlds fit
D equally well. This lets us define an equivalence relation on the set of possible
worlds:
D-outcome. A D-outcome oi is a set of possible worlds such that all worlds
in oi fit D equally well.
We then define a fit function F(oi,D) from D-outcomes to the interval [0, 1], which
describes how well the worlds in that outcome fit D (Sharadin & Dellsén 2019:
1281–1282).
But if I do some action A, it might be non-trivially probabilistic which outcome
will obtain—non-trivially probabilistic how well the world will fit D. For example,
if A is buying one raffle ticket, and D is winning the raffle, then there is some
probability p(o1|A) that I win the raffle, and D-outcome o1, where F(o1,D) = 1,
obtains. There is a somewhat larger probability p(o2|A) that I lose the raffle,
and D-outcome o2 obtains, where F(o2,D) = 0. To cope with this, we define the





This function weights the D-outcomes by how probable they are if I do A. Now,
we can state Contrastive Expected Fit account:
Contrastive Expected Fit. A-ing rather than B-ing promotes D iff A’s
expected fit with D is greater than B’s expected fit with D. (Sharadin &
Dellsén 2019: 1282)
Suppose that I have some reason to bring about D. Then if oX is the outcome of
my doing X, the fit account says that as F(oX ,D) increases, so does the strength
of my reason to X. In particular, and in more precisely contrastive terms, if the
causal upshot of A-ing better fits D than the causal upshot of B-ing does, then I
have more reason to A than to B.
The account has implications concerning desires which are not impossible.
Plausibly and correctly, given normal assumptions, Contrastive Expected Fit says
that buying one ticket rather than buying no tickets promotes my desire to win
the raffle.
But Contrastive Expected Fit also implies that there can be no desires which
provide ‘all or nothing’ reasons, where there is a very strong reason to A iff
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Probabilistic Promotion and Ability · 977
F(oA,D) = 1, but no reason whatsoever to A iff F(oA,D) 6= 1. The account also
implies that there can be no uncanny valley, where there is strong reason to
completely fit some desire or leave it completely unfitted, but weak or no reason
to fit it moderately well. These consequences are not obviously incorrect, but are
at least in need of defence.
Contrastive Expected Fit is contrastive. We may compare actions by how well
they promote a state of affairs, but there is no invariant baseline for comparisons.
Contrastive Expected Fit does not (strictly speaking) answer cases such as Buttons:
it does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether Debbie promotes
her desire by pushing A. Whether she does depends on the contrastive baseline
which is specified by context (Sharadin & Dellsén 2019: esp. 1273). Though
this might be a pill we can swallow, it is a disadvantage for the view, because it
seems intuitively clear that Debbie does promote the satisfaction of her desire,
and without some serious argument an appeal to context here seems unsatisfying.
Of course, Sharadin and Dellsén do provide arguments for a move to con-
trastivism. These arguments amount to the claim that an invariant account of
fit—one with a baseline—would ‘face exactly the same sorts of trouble faced by
non-contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion’ (Sharadin & Dellsén 2019:
1283, esp. n. 45). In other words, Buttons-type and three-action cases. Similarly,
Snedegar (2014: 49; 2017: 89) defends a moderate contrastivism (where reasons
are contrastive, but the promotion relation is invariant) by appeal to the apparent
failure of invariantism about reasons. So the primary motivation for contrastivism
is the apparent failure of invariantism. If we can provide a successful invariantist
account, the main extant motivation for contrastivism is undercut.
2.2. The Impossible Promotion Argument
Sharadin and Dellsén rely on examples like the following, to argue that impossible
desires—which are impossible to satisfy—can nevertheless be promoted:
Extreme Ascetic. The desire that none of your desires are satisfied. (Sharadin
& Dellsén 2019: 1274)
Let’s accept for the sake of argument that this fairly unusual desire cannot be
satisfied. Sharadin and Dellsén argue that Extreme Ascetic provides reasons for
action (which implies that it can be promoted). In particular, they argue that if an
agent Agatha has Extreme Ascetic, then if she is offered a desire-frustration pill
which will ensure that fewer of her desires are satisfied than at present—but not
none of them, which is impossible—then she has a reason to take the pill.10 If they
are right, then this looks fatal to probabilism, which says that Extreme Ascetic
cannot be promoted, and thus that it provides no reason to take the pill.
10. I’m grateful to Robert Mason for catching a mistake in a previous version of this case.
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But the fit account could explain such a reason rather well: Extreme Ascetic
cannot be satisfied, but the world can be made to better fit the desire, thereby
promoting it. So if Extreme Ascetic can be promoted, then not only does this show
that impossible desires can be promoted, sinking probabilism, but also that fit is
a promising theory of their promotion. So if it can be promoted, then Extreme
Ascetic does double duty in defence of the fit account.
So how can a probabilist account for any reasons in the ascetic case? Extreme
Ascetic won’t do the job, so if there are reasons, then they must be grounded in
some other desire. (I write that a reason to A is ‘grounded in’ some outcome if
what explains the reason is that it would promote that outcome.) In particular,
the probabilist is likely to say that the reason for her to take the pill is grounded
in a ‘neighbourhood desire’ such as:
Comparative Ascetic. The desire that as few of her desires as possible are
satisfied. (Cf. Sharadin & Dellsén 2019: 1275; DiPaolo & Behrends 2015: 5)
So if Agatha has only Extreme Ascetic (and not the neighbourhood desire Compar-
ative Ascetic), then probabilism says that she lacks any reason to frustrate some
of her desires.
To further draw out the implications, suppose that Agatha has 100 desires,
and is offered a choice between two pills. The better pill would frustrate 51 of
her desires; the worse pill would frustrate only 50. If impossible desires can be
promoted, and especially if this can be done by fit, then Agatha plausibly has a
stronger reason to take the better pill than the worse one. Probabilism, however,
denies that she has a reason to take either pill, and says that the reasons she has
to take either pill are equally strong (i.e., not at all). Sharadin and Dellsén find
this ‘bewildering’ (2019: 1276); for the record, I find it wholly natural.
This is a stalemate, so I’ll now pursue a different line of argument.
2.3. The Structure of the Examples
The examples used by Sharadin and Dellsén are very friendly to the fit account.
They involve desires which are typically—in psychologically normal agents—
accompanied by neighbourhood desires.
Sharadin is of course not blind to the possibility of a neighbourhood desire
explanation, and rightly asks on what grounds the probabilist can assume that
one must exist.11 But he doesn’t consider the answer I have in mind: that in
psychologically typical agents, Extreme Ascetic would normally have some kind
of explanation—an explanation that also explains the neighbourhood desire. In
other words, there is a third desire or other psychological state, which is a common
11. See DiPaolo and Behrends (2015: 5) and Sharadin (2016: 3ff.) for discussion of this
move.
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explanation of Extreme Ascetic and Comparative Ascetic.
I’ll argue that this is so, by working through the cases.
Why would someone hold Extreme Ascetic? A very common explanation
would be a proto-Buddhist religious conviction that desire satisfaction is to be
avoided. But it would be odd to have Extreme Ascetic on such grounds, without
also having the neighbourhood desire Comparative Ascetic: if one thinks that
desire satisfaction is to be avoided, this will likely motivate one to desire that as
few as possible of one’s desires are satisfied.
Similar points can be made about an earlier example of Sharadin’s:
Live Forever. Suppose an agent desires to live forever and is offered a pill
that will extend her life by a thousand years. The agent has a reason to
take the pill. And this is so because taking the pill promotes her desire to
live forever. (Sharadin 2015: 1379)
Why desire immortality? This is not an easy philosophical question, but standard
explanations include a desire to avoid the pain and indignity of dying, and a desire
to enjoy as much as possible of what life has to offer. Both of these explanatory
desires would also clearly explain a neighbourhood desire for a thousand extra
years of life. The former explains it via temporal discounting—if we must undergo
something we fear, the further in the future, the better—and the latter explains it
more directly: if we wish to enjoy what life has to offer, then a thousand extra
years of that is most welcome.
Granting such commonplaces about the psychology of normal agents, we have
independent grounds to posit explanatory desires and accompanying neighbour-
hood desires in these cases. One could in principle have Extreme Ascetic without
Comparative Ascetic, for example, but this is highly unlikely in normal agents.
Now we can of course try to stipulate that the relevant neighbourhood desire
is absent. But it would be an odd person who held Extreme Ascetic as a basic
or unexplained desire, and our intuitions about such people are not likely to be
trustworthy or even widely shared. I think this is at the root of the stalemate.12
A better strategy is to construct cases where it is independently plausible that
there is no neighbourhood desire, without resorting to excessive stipulation.
I’ll choose a dystopian case. I am in Montreal, and have a strong desire to
see the Pacific Coast of Canada, because I wish to see the sun set over the ocean,
which of course I can only do on the West coast. In particular, I wish to see the
Pacific sunset after a long roadtrip—after driving across the country. (Background
psychological fact: I like driving, but find it very tiring, and so I’m particularly
fond of ocean sunsets after long drives.)
12. Compare Sobel (2016b) on amoralism and subjectivism about reasons: agents with no
subjective reasons to treat others well would be quite unusual.
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Unfortunately the world has run out of fuel, and I have the last supply. I only
have enough to get me as far as Saskatchewan. Assuming it is certain that the
desire is impossible, there is clearly no reason to drive to Saskatchewan. Without
some other justification it would be irrational, since doing so takes time and
effort, especially during the apocalypse. So there seems to be no promotion here.
Moreover, the analogue of the better versus worse pill argument doesn’t get any
purchase either. I have no more reason to drive to western Saskatchewan than to
eastern Saskatchewan.
In this new example, we have no promotion and no reason. The original
cases of impossible desires brought with them (in psychologically typical agents)
neighbourhood desires which everyone agrees can be promoted. But the new case
is constructed to avoid this.
For probabilism, driving to Saskatchewan promotes my desire only insofar
as doing so raises the probability that the desire will be satisfied. In the actual
world, this is likely the case: fuel is widely available in rich countries. So setting
off from Montreal with insufficient fuel (inevitable, if I have a normal vehicle
with a normal fuel tank) raises the probability that I’ll make it to the West coast,
because there’s a good probability that I’ll be able to buy more along the way.
But in the fuel-depleted apocalypse, this is not so. If the petrol stations are
all deserted, and there is no probability that I will be able to get my car from
Saskatchewan to the West coast, then I have no reason to drive halfway across
Canada. This seems correct—doing so would be pointless, futile. So probabilism
neatly explains why in the new example there is no reason to drive halfway
across Canada. There is a disparity between the old and the new cases, which
probabilism can neatly explain in terms of neighbourhood desires.
I don’t wish to claim that the fit account cannot explain this disparity (or
explain it away), but here are some reasons to be skeptical that this can be done.
Much would depend on the details of the fit relation—one option would be to
spell out that relation in such a way that the drive wouldn’t increase fit. But if the
fit relation is simply the similarity of possible worlds, then it seems hard to deny
that a world in which I drive halfway across Canada better fits a world in which I
drive all the way across Canada to see a sunset than a world in which I remain in
Montreal does. Any spelling out would need to leave untouched the fit verdicts
that Sharadin and Dellsén appeal to—for example, that frustrating half of one’s
desires increases fit with an outcome in which none of one’s desires are satisfied.
Sharadin and Dellsén could instead say that the intuition concerning the
sunset is wrong, and there is a reason to drive to Saskatchewan. (Or in more
contrastively-respectable terms: that a world in which I drive to Saskatchewan
better fits my desire to see a sunset over the ocean than does a world in which I
stay in Montreal.)
But this strategy becomes less promising once we see the trick to constructing
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new cases of this general sort. We simply specify a goal—that I reach another star
in my lifetime; that I gather 100 billion people in a room—which is acknowledged
to be impossible. Then consider actions which would go some way towards fitting
that goal—climbing up a tall building; gathering 100 people in a room—and ask
whether the goal provides any reason to do that.
Suppose that the desire to visit another star in one’s lifetime is the strongest,
most important desire in your life. If you could get to another solar system,
then you would have very strong reasons to do many things in pursuit of that
goal. But the goal is known to be impossible. Suppose that at the moment, the
Earth’s position is such that if you climb up a tall university building, you will
be marginally further away from the Sun, and closer to some other star. Does
your desire give you any reason to go up in the lift to the top floor? I think,
clearly not. But this case has a similar structure to Extreme Ascetic (getting a few
hundred feet closer to another star is structurally similar to frustrating a few of
your desires, though of course on a different scale). The fit account can bite the
bullet and say that there are reasons in such cases, but this means that there are
very many reasons indeed, to do many things in pursuit of knowably impossible
goals.
Probabilism is in a dialectically better situation here. Probabilism’s problem
was the lack of reasons in certain cases; this can be remedied, as we have seen, by
adding background or neighbourhood desires. The reader will have to judge for
herself how plausible my general psychological claims about the presence of such
desires are. But the fit account faces a problem of there being too much promotion:
promotion and attendant reasons in cases where this is implausible. And this
problem is not something that can easily be tweaked by adding or removing
desires, because it rests on fundamental features of the account. (This line of
argument may seem a little ironic when I come to defend my own view, below.
Needless to say, I think that’s different.)
3. Causal Impotence and Promotion
I’ve just criticised a non-probabilist account of promotion, and argued that impos-
sible desires cannot be promoted—something which probabilism neatly explains.
This seems to count in favour of probabilism. But before that, I criticised a recent
probabilist account. So I’ll now defend a new probabilism about promotion.
First, I’ll explain the underlying picture. I will appeal to a notion of those
actions—including inaction, or doing nothing—that the agent can do, which
are available to her in some sense. Let’s suppose that at each moment, there
are a number of (exclusive) actions that each agent S can do. Her ‘ability set’
F = {A1, A2, ..., An} contains these actions. F will typically include a member that
corresponds to her doing nothing.
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F’s membership need not be wholly determinate. Does it include actions that
someone is prevented from taking by compulsion or mental illness? The reality is
no doubt messy, but such messiness is familiar in this area: ought (can) the addict
avoid alcohol? It seems hard to give a general answer to this question.
It might also be wondered how the members of F are individuated. For
example, does Debbie’s ability set have as a subset just {push A}, or (also) {push A
instead of B, push A instead of C}? Clearly a full discussion of the individuation
of actions is beyond the scope of this paper, but it’s plausible that this question
doesn’t matter: as probabilists, we care only about conditional probabilities, and
p(D|A) = p(D|A instead of B) = p(D|A instead of C).
These are just a quick responses, and I acknowledge that hidden dangers
may lie here. But we are most interested in cases where F’s membership is
stipulated. With such caveats, let’s grant the notion of an ability set. Ability is
not a probabilistic notion, and it differs extensionally from probabilistic notions.
We can see this by considering the biconditional ‘necessarily, S can A iff the
probability that S does A is nonzero’.
The right-to-left direction seems clearly true. It’s hard to see how there could
be non-zero probability that S As, if S can’t A.
But the left-to-right direction is false in cases where S can do something, but
is probabilistically certain not to. We saw this in the No Probability version of
Buttons. I’m not sure whether there are any actual such cases, but they seem at
least coherent, and it’s hard to see a principled argument against the possibility.
We want our account of promotion to render plausible verdicts in such cases—if
possible.
If S cannot affect the probability of some outcome D, then we’ll say that she is
‘causally impotent’ with respect to D:
Causal impotence. S is causally impotent with respect to some outcome
D iff for all Am and An in her ability set F, p(D|Am) = p(D|An).
In other words, S is causally impotent iff the probability of D does not depend
on what she does now, of the things she can do. Obvious instances of causal
impotence involve impossible desires—whatever I do, the probability of their
satisfaction remains 0—as well as outcomes concerning necessary truths and
(absent backwards causation) facts about the past. More prosaically, I am causally
impotent with respect to the decay of some distant atom in the next 30 seconds,
the explosion of the Moon, and the outcome that the next person to order soup in
central London will order minestrone. (I am not in London.)
I claim that in general, S can promote an outcome D iff she is not causally
impotent with respect to D. S can promote D iff there are actions A and B in
F, where p(D|A) 6= p(D|B). Promotion requires causal potence. The thought
behind this is—remembering that ‘promote’ here is stipulative and defined by
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its connection with reasons—if the probability of D is the same whatever S does,
then how can there be a reason to do any particular action rather than another?
S cannot influence whether D comes about, so D should be irrelevant to her
deliberation.
I argued above that impossible desires can’t be promoted; this also follows
from the general claim. That general claim is perhaps most likely to run into
resistance in cases of inevitable outcomes, where whatever the agent does, some
outcome has probability 1.
There are three possibilities—and in none does promotion occur.
First, suppose that whatever S does, the outcome D obtains, and her actions
are outside the causal chain leading to D. It should be fairly uncontroversial
that there is no promotion in such cases. For example, we do not promote the
outcomes that necessary truths obtain, or that facts about the past continue to
obtain.13
Second, suppose that D will occur whatever S does, but it’s under her control
whether any action of hers is part of the causal chain that leads to D. For example,
consider the outcome that Smith is dead by the end of the century. If you shoot
him, he dies today. If you do not shoot him, he dies of old age later this century.
So the probability of his death this century is 1 whatever you do. I find it wholly
obvious that your shooting him does not promote his death this century, though
of course you might promote other outcomes, such as that he dies today or at your
hand.
But you can be the proximate cause of his death, and it might be objected that
clearly if one’s action is the proximate cause of how an outcome obtains, then
one promotes that outcome. I think here we simply have a clash of intuitions:
if you accept this objection, then you are not a probabilist. SPP and Finlay’s
counterfactual view agree with mine on this case, for what it’s worth. Indeed, Lin
explicitly rejects his Sufficiency Principle: ‘S’s doing A promotes p if it causes p to
obtain’ (2018: 367). For Do Nothing, whether you promote his death this century
depends on whether his death was caused by a positive act of yours, or simply
by your doing nothing—another implausibility for that baseline. Depending on
one’s moral theory, one might still be blameworthy for shooting Smith—and there
might also be non-promotional reasons not to shoot him. These are separate
questions.
Thirdly, and finally, suppose that whatever S does, her actions are part of the
causal chain leading to D. I claim that in such cases, S doesn’t promote D. The
upshot is that we cannot be forced to promote an outcome: if we are put in a
situation where whatever we do, the probability of the outcome is the same—
13. This, I think, is a counterexample to Sharadin’s earlier ‘Behrends-DiPaolo Constraint’,
which implies that nearly everything we do promotes such outcomes. See Sharadin (2015: esp.
1374).
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perhaps because it is certain—then we do not promote that outcome. This claim
is at least somewhat counterintuitive (to some, if not always to me). Once again,
I think, a probabilist simply has to accept the verdict. But we can mitigate its
surprisingness by considering more causally distant examples. It is plausible that
any action I can do now is part of the causal chain which leads to the heat death
of the universe. Did my pacing the room just now promote the heat death of the
universe? I hope not.
I’ll now defend a probabilistic account of promotion.
4. Ranking Probabilism about Promotion
When S is not causally impotent with respect to D, then she can promote D, and
in such cases we can rank the things she can do by D’s conditional probability:
Ranking Probabilism about Promotion. Am promotes D to greater degree
than An does iff p(D|Am) > p(D|An).
There will often be ties, where p(D|Am) = p(D|An). But if the case is not one of
causal impotence, then not every member of the ability set will be tied.
Ranking Probabilism implies that S has more reason to Am than to An if and
only if p(D|Am) > p(D|An). That is, if and only if Am ranks higher than An in
terms of the conditional probability of D. In particular, some action(s) will rank
bottom, though they need not have conditional probability 0. S has least reason
to do such actions. Similarly, S has most reason to do those action(s) which rank
top—which need not have conditional probability 1.
We can now see why in the Extreme Ascetic case, Agatha has no more reason
to take one pill than another: the probability of her desire’s satisfaction is 0
whether she takes the better pill or the worse one.
My primary claim is that when we are considering only one desire or outcome,
Ranking Probabilism provides all the verdictive normative facts: it tells us what
we have most reason to do, what we have least reason to do, and for any act that
we can do, it tells us how it compares to the other acts in our ability set. And—
other than the definition of the ability set itself!—this is cashed out in purely
probabilist terms. We could stop here, and simply adopt Ranking Probabilism
(without a baseline). But this is too revisionary—a last resort—and so I’ll instead
try to defend a plausible baseline.
5. Flat Probabilism
With the idea of an ability set in hand, a natural baseline would assume that each
action in the ability set is equally likely to be done:
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Flat Probabilism. S’s A-ing promotes D if and only if p(D|A) > 1|F| ∑Ai∈F p(D|Ai).
According to Flat Probabilism, the baseline probability of D is the mean of the
probabilities p(D|Am), for all Am ∈ F. Only actions which are above average
(mean) in terms of the probability of D will promote D.
To my knowledge, nobody defends Flat Probabilism, though Stephen Finlay
defends an account of ‘ought’ which excludes ‘any information about the agent’s
dispositions to choose one means over another’. Instead, each action is assumed
to be equally likely: ‘relative to such a background each alternative has equal
probability’ (Finlay 2014: 73).14 We can easily construct counterexamples to Flat
Probabilism as an account of promotion. (To be clear, this is not a problem for
Finlay: the counterexamples to follow involve sub-optimal actions, and as such
don’t affect Finlay’s view about ‘ought’, which concerns optimal actions.)
First, in Rhys’s raffle, assume that Rhys can buy any number of tickets, up
to 500. Flat Probabilism says that buying (exactly) 10 tickets doesn’t promote his
goal of winning the raffle, because there was antecedently equal probability of
him buying every number of tickets. But it’s intuitively implausible that buying
10 tickets doesn’t promote his winning the raffle.
Second, multiplying actions near the bottom of the ranking affects whether
actions near (but not at) the top of the ranking promote some outcome. Flat Prob-
abilism is disposition-insensitive, so it doesn’t face a three-action case problem,
but the structure here is similar. In everyday cases, this can lead to absurd results.
Suppose that I give you £100, £20, or £1 to buy lottery tickets, in decreasing order
of the conditional probability of D. If the probabilities are appropriately specified,
then Flat Probabilism implies that whether giving you £20 promotes D—whether
I have a contributory reason to give you £20—depends on how the £1 option is
individuated. But why should whether giving you £20 promotes some outcome
depend on whether I have just a £1 coin in my other pocket, or also a pair of 50p
pieces, or those plus five 10p pieces?
The central problem is that for Flat Probabilism, the baseline depends on how
many means there are to reaching some goal. I’ll now turn to my own preferred
baseline, where promotion depends on whether there is some lower-ranked means
available.
6. The Minimal Baseline
Here is my preferred baseline:
Minimal Probabilism about Promotion. S’s A-ing promotes D if and only
if there is some B in S’s ability set such that p(D|A) > p(D|B).
14. I am indebted to Stephen Finlay for invaluable discussion and comments.
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The intuitive picture behind the baseline is this: as in Ranking Probablism, the
actions S can do may be ranked by the conditional probability of D. Any action
which does not rank bottom promotes D.
Minimal Probabilism isn’t disposition-sensitive. As such, it avoids SPP’s
ephemerality problem in No Probability cases: recall that p0(D) = p1(D) = 1
does not imply that S is causally impotent with respect to D. There could be some
B in S’s ability set, such that p(D|B) = 0, but p0(B) = 0. SPP says that in such a
case, S’s A-ing doesn’t promote D. Minimal Probabilism disagrees.
Now, let’s turn to Buttons. If Debbie pushes A or B, then her desire will be
satisfied, but if she pushes C, then it will not. For simplicity, I ignore all other
possible actions (including doing nothing). Lin asked whether there was any prob-
ability that Debbie would push C. I claim that this is the wrong disambiguating
question. We should ask: can Debbie push button C? Is C in her ability set?
In the canonical presentation of Buttons, we are not explicitly told that Debbie
can push C, but it is heavily implied. Ignoring other possible actions, as we
are, Debbie can push button C iff she is not causally impotent with respect to
her desire, because only if she pushes C will her desire not be satisfied. If my
account is correct, then whether she can push C is crucial to whether her pushing
A promotes the satisfaction of her desire. Let’s consider both possibilities.
First, suppose that Debbie can push C. This version—call it ‘Buttons with
Some Ability’—seems the most natural way of understanding the case. As I
mentioned, it seems to be implied in the original description of Buttons.15 She
pushes A; had she not pushed A then she wouldn’t have pushed C, but she was
able to do so. She wasn’t causally impotent with respect to her desire. Ranking
Probabilism says that she had more reason to push A than to push C; more reason
to push B than to push C; and equally strong reason to push A as to push B.
Because pushing A and pushing B each rank above the bottom in her ability set,
Minimal Probabilism says that both of those actions do promote the satisfaction
of that desire. This is the intuitively correct verdict for this version of Buttons,
which we have been trying to capture.
Second, let’s consider the other version—Buttons with No Ability—where
pushing C is not in her ability set. Perhaps that button is in a locked glass case.
Again ignoring options besides the three buttons, there are only two things that
she can do (push A or push B). Whatever she does, her desire will be satisfied.
As I argued above, in such cases of causal impotence, she doesn’t promote the
satisfaction of her desire. After all, there is nothing else she could have done that
would have made her desire less than certain to be satisfied. Minimal Probabilism
again captures this verdict.
This is a victory for Minimal Probabilism. Other than Do Nothing, it’s the
15. Joshua DiPaolo (personal communication) tells me that this is how he understands
Buttons.
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only account we’ve seen which respects the intuitive verdict in Buttons, without
introducing context-dependence or disposition-sensitivity.
Working through these cases illustrates an important asymmetry that Minimal
Promotion introduces. Likelihood facts about how S will presently act should
not be taken into account in determining whether that act would promote some
outcome, but likelihood facts about how other agents will act do seem importantly
relevant. The causal chain from S’s act to the likelihood of D may go via the
acts of other agents, and so their dispositions will determine whether her act
promotes some outcome, and what reasons she has. But (at least if I’m right that
promotion is not disposition-sensitive), her own dispositions to act at present
do not determine her reasons. (What about her future dispositions? This issue
is beyond the scope of this paper, but Minimal Probabilism allows for both
sensitivity and insensitivity about S’s own future dispositions. I lean towards the
former.)
That’s the view. Now, we turn to its surprising implication.
7. What Reasons Do We Have?
The problem of the sticky baseline is that since promotion involves a probability
exceeding the baseline in some way, promotion cannot occur in those cases where
we stick to the baseline. According to Minimal Probabilism, the baseline is the
(probabilistically) worst an agent can do with respect to an outcome. This is why
it doesn’t face a problem of the sticky baseline, except perhaps in cases of causal
impotence: it’s highly unlikely that we would wish to count doing the worst we
can with respect to D as promoting D.
But such a low baseline might lead us to the opposite problem. Minimal
Probabilism implies that we have very many reasons. Here’s the example I’ll rely
on: I desire that D, to have $20,000 in ten years. I now have $10,000 in cash, and
there are just five actions in my ability set, in rank order:
• A1: invest all the money. p(D|A1) = 0.7
• A2: put all the money in a savings account. p(D|A2) = 0.3
• A3: do nothing. p(D|A3) = 0.1
• A4: give half the money to charity. p(D|A4) = 0.05
• A5: give all the money to charity. p(D|A5) = 0.01
Ranking Probablism captures the verdictive ‘ought’ or ‘most reason’ facts:
there is more reason to A1 than to A2, than to A3, than to A4, than to A5. So far,
so good.
Minimal Probabilism says that there are reasons for every action except A5.
So a desire to have twice as much money in ten years gives me some reason to
Ergo · vol. 6, no. 34 · 2019
988 · Luke Elson
give away half of my money now—making the probability that I double my money
far lower than it would be if I simply do nothing. I’ll consider two objections to
this feature of Minimal Probabilism.
7.1. Cheap Reasons
The first objection is simply that the claim in question—that I have a reason to
A4—is manifestly implausible. I don’t find it so, but perhaps I’ve just got used to
it. At any rate, it is a consequence of Minimal Probabilism that I will defend.
First, note that the disposition-sensitive baselines can also imply that I have
reason to give away half of my money. In a three-action case, if I was antecedently
likely to give away all of my money, then SPP says that giving away only half
promotes my desire. Since Finlay’s Counterfactual baseline is also disposition-
sensitive, we can rig a similar case there, too: suppose that if I did not give away
half of my money, then I would have given away all of it. But that is a negative,
defensive mode of argument.
Here’s a positive case for the existence of a reason to A4. I’ll argue by dilemma.
Are there only reasons for actions, or are there also reasons against actions?
The first horn is that that there are only reasons for actions. Here, Minimal
Probabilism seems clearly correct about the case. We can all agree that there is no
reason to give all of one’s money to charity. But it also seems clear that there is less
reason to give all of the money to charity than to give half of the money to charity.
Someone who did the former would be more rationally criticisable than someone
who did the latter. (Remember that there is only one outcome in play—that of
doubling one’s money.) So there is no reason to donate all of the money, and
less reason to donate all of the money than to donate half of the money. Since
there can be no reasons against, we must say that there is some reason to donate
half of the money. Otherwise, what explains the verdictive difference? If there is
no reason to donate half of the money, then the verdictive difference rests on no
contributory difference, which is implausible.
On the second horn of the dilemma, there are indeed reasons against actions.
Discussion of this horn will take much longer.
Here is how reasons against can be accommodated by Minimal Probabilism.
We again say that A-ing dis-promotes D iff A-ing promotes ¬D, and that there is a
promotional reason against A-ing iff A-ing dis-promotes D. Taken together, these
claims imply that there is a reason against A-ing when A promotes ¬D. This is
so when there is some C in the agent’s ability set such that p(D|C) > p(D|A).
The intuitive picture is that in accord with Ranking Probablism, the actions that
an agent can do may be ranked by the conditional probability of D. Minimal
Probabilism says there is a reason for every action except that which ranks bottom.
It also says that there is also a reason against every action which doesn’t rank top.
All of the intermediate actions promote both D and ¬D, and there are reasons
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both for and against them.
Here is why this might look like a problem. If there are reasons against
actions, isn’t it much more plausible that there are (only) reasons against A4 and
against A5, and that the verdictive difference between the two actions is explained
by the latter reason being stronger? Yes, this is an intuitively attractive picture.
But it is also unsustainable. As we’ve seen, baselines which try to capture this
verdict—most obviously, Do Nothing—run into the problem of the sticky baseline.
But just how implausible is the picture painted by Minimal Probabilism? Not
so much as one might think! It is independently plausible—once one gets into the
right frame of mind—that there is a reason to A4, as well as a reason against A4.
I’ll appeal to T. M. Scanlon’s uncontroversial claim that ‘the concept of a
reason is that of a consideration that “counts in favor of” something for an agent
in certain circumstances’ (Scanlon 2014: 44). This is a general conceptual claim
which doesn’t seem to be tied to any particular theory of reasons.
There is a consideration which counts in favour of A4: whatever makes it rank
higher than A5. If I did A4, and you asked me to justify my actions, I would have
something to say in my defence—that A4 ranks higher than A5 (at least I didn’t
give away all of my money!)—whereas had I done A5, I would have nothing to say
in my defence. A reminder: we are concerned only with the outcome of doubling
my money in ten years. I might have other things to say in my defence, but they
are not relevant here.
In fact, I have nothing to say in my defence in either case. Nothing can get me
off the hook for not doing A1, which is what I have most reason to do—what I
ought to do. So perhaps it’s better to say that if I A4, I have something to say in
mitigation of my guilt, but nothing to say in mitigation if I A5. It’s not a stretch to
claim that anything I might say in mitigation of my guilt is a consideration that
counts in favour of my action, and so is a reason for my action. (More precisely:
anything I might say about the actions in question could be such a reason; appeals
to my mental state and so on can be excuses or mitigations but might not be
reasons.)
But, of course, claims such as ‘a reason is a consideration which counts in
favour’ are often appealed to by those who claim that there can be no informative
account of what it is to be a reason. For example, Scanlon defends Reasons
Fundamentalism:
truths about reasons are not reducible to or identifiable with non-normative
truths, such as truths about the natural world of physical objects, causes
and effects, nor can they be explained in terms of notions of rationality or
rational agency that are not themselves claims about reasons. (2014: 2)
But what if reasons are not fundamental? I’ll also argue that two prominent and
putatively informative theories of reasons—reasons as evidence, and its more
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popular cousin, reasons as explanations—can accommodate a reason to A4.
According to the former view, a reason for S to A is evidence that S ought
to A (see, e.g., Kearns & Star 2008). And the fact that A4 ranks higher than A5
(or whatever grounds that fact) is indeed evidence that S ought to A4. First,
it excludes the possibility that A4 is the worst option available to S. That this
evidence is outweighed by reasons against A4—evidence that one ought not to
A4—doesn’t prevent that evidence being an (outweighed) reason. This is simply
one way for the reasons-as-evidence view to handle outweighed reasons.
According to the reasons-as-explanations view, however, to be a reason to
A4 is to be (part of) what explains something. For example, here is Schroeder’s
Humean account, with some notational modifications:
Schroeder-Reason. For R to be a reason for S to A is for there to be some
D such that S has a desire whose object is D, and the truth of R is part of
what explains why S’s doing A promotes D. (Cf. Schroeder 2007: 59)
In other words, if I have a reason to A4, this is a (perhaps partial) explanation of
why doing A4 would promote the outcome that I double my money. And there is
such an explanation: if I A4, the chance that I achieve my outcome is much greater
than if I A5, which I could also do. (Or perhaps the reason is the explanation of
this fact. The point is that there is such an explanation in the area.) Since Minimal
Probabilism says that A4 promotes the outcome that I double my money, adding
that there is an explanation for why A4 promotes that outcome doesn’t introduce
any additional implausibility.
Clearly there is much more to be said about the nature of reasons, but I’ve
argued that the apparently excessive cheapness of Minimal Probabilism—as
exemplified by the claim that I have a reason to A4—fits naturally with a general
conceptual claim about reasons, and with two popular accounts of reasons.
But if there are such reasons, why would it be so absurd to say that my desire
to double my money supports giving away half of my money? Predictably, my
answer appeals to pragmatic considerations. Such reasons are not normally worth
mentioning and are potentially misleading. We can be fooled into thinking that
they don’t exist. In the present case, I ought not do anything except A1—invest all
the money—and mentioning any reasons to do anything else could be seriously
misleading, or at least pointless.
But they can be made worth mentioning. The reason to A4 can be brought out
by varying the case, and in particular considering a case of multiple competing
reasons. Suppose that besides my wealth target, I have another outcome to
promote. I’ll put it in Humean terms. I have no desire to donate more than a
token amount to my college which is—rightly or wrongly—a charity, but I do
have a very strong desire to donate something. The college has a target that some
proportion of its graduates donate to the annual fund, and I have a very strong
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desire to help them meet this target (perhaps I simply desire that my name get on
the list of those who have donated).
To be clear, this is a changed choice situation in one way—an additional desire
and therefore reason is added—but the choice situation remains unchanged in
that my ability set is unchanged, and the causal upshots of the members of that
set are also unchanged. An objective is simply added.
Call this charitable outcome ‘E’. Then p(E|A1) = p(E|A2) = p(E|A3) = 0,
and p(E|A4) = p(E|A5) = 1. So Minimal Probabilism says that I have a reason
(grounded in E) to A4, and an equally strong one to A5, but no such reason to do
any of the other actions.
I now have to act with two outcomes supplying reasons, so plausibly what
I ought to do all-things-considered depends on the relative importance of those
outcomes. Such a theory of weighing competing reasons is beyond the scope of
this paper, so here I’ll simply stipulate a verdictive outcome: the outcome E of
donating to my college is so important, that when both outcomes are taken into
account, A1, A2, and A3 have far less rational support than A4 and A5 do.
So now, ought I donate half (A4) or all (A5) of my money to the college? Since
both of these two actions involve a donation, the charitable reason to donate
something is silent between them. But in terms of my wealth desire, the former
does much better. Clearly, I ought to A4. A5 would involve expected financial loss
for no charitable gain. This brings out the consideration which counts in favour
of A4: doing so keeps the probability of doubling my money higher than A5 does,
even though A4 goes out of the way to reduce that probability.
Minimal Probabilism implies that such considerations are pragmatically
swamped in ordinary talk of reasons—they are rarely mentioned because negligi-
ble or misleading—but the weighing case makes them salient. Clearly, there are
things that my opponent can say in response. But I hope I’ve shown that it’s not
so implausible as one might think that there’s a reason to A4.
7.2. Restricted Exclusivity
There’s a more technical version of the cheapness worry, which rests on the fact
that there is a reason both for and against each intermediate action A2, A3, and
A4. According to Snedegar, such both-ways reasons are impossible.
First, a little background. Snedegar’s Contrastive view of reasons—which
rests on a non-contrastive promotion relation—says that given a (possibly non-
exhaustive) set of actions Q, and where O is the objective to be promoted, the
following principle holds:
Snedegar-Against. r is a reason against A-ing out of Q iff there’s some
O of the relevant kind such that r explains why B-ing better promotes O
than A-ing, for some other alternative B in Q. (Snedegar 2017: 77)
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Snedegar is here assuming a version of reasons-as-explanations. But Contrastivism
doesn’t rely on this. Snedegar-Against agrees with Minimal Probabilism about
how cheap reasons against are: every action which doesn’t best promote O has
a reason against it. If cheap reasons against are a cost of Minimal Probabilism,
then Contrastivism shares this cost: Snedegar’s view faces its own version of the
cheapness or ‘liberality’ worry when it comes to reasons against actions (Snedegar
2017: 80).
But while Minimal Probabilism also has cheap reasons for actions, Con-
trastivism makes reasons for actions very expensive:
Snedegar-For. r is a reason for you to A out of Q iff there’s some O of the
relevant kind such that r explains why A-ing better promotes O than B,
for all the other alternatives B in Q. (Snedegar 2017: 78)
So where Minimal Probabilism says that there is a reason for every action except
that which ranks bottom, Snedegar-For says that there are only reasons for those
actions which rank top. Reasons against actions may be very cheap, but reasons
for actions are very expensive.
Let’s suppose that Q is everything Rhys can do. It seems implausible that
unless A-ing is the best Rhys can do, then he has no reason to A. But Snedegar-For
implies that Rhys has no reason to buy nearly all, but not all, of the tickets. Such
a claim seems to me to confuse verdictive claims (about what one ought to do)
with contributory claims (about what one has some reason to do).
Contrastivism also introduces an odd asymmetry between reasons for and
against. Where Minimal Probabilism faces a cheapness worry in both directions—
there is a reason both for and against buying 499 tickets—Contrastivism faces a
cheapness worry in one direction (there is a reason against buying 499 tickets),
but also its opposite in the other direction: there is no reason to buy 499 tickets.
Minimal Probablism has to explain cheapness; Contrastivism has to explain
cheapness (of reasons against) and also its opposite (of reasons for).
It might be wondered whether Minimal Probabilism about Promotion can be
reconciled with Snedegar’s view.16 At heart, the views are irreconcilable. They
disagree about the role of promotion in a theory of reasons: my Absolute Reason-
Promote says that there is a reason to A iff A-ing promotes a relevant outcome,
but Snedegar-For denies this: promotion is not sufficient for there to be a reason.
We could force the views together, perhaps, but only by bleaching out their core
theoretical commitments.
So by my lights, Snedegar-For is implausible. But of course Snedegar has has
good reasons for his view. He considers a view similar to Minimal Probabilism,
that an outcome ‘O can give you a reason to A relative to some set when your
16. I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
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A-ing would better promote O than some other alternative in the set’ (Snedegar
2017: 78) .He rejects it because it leads to both-ways reasons—for example, both
for and against A4—by appeal to the following principle:
Restricted Exclusivity. For all facts r, agents s, actions A, and objectives o,
o cannot explain both why r is a reason for s to A and why r is a reason
for s not to A. (Snedegar 2017: 31)17
Restricted Exclusivity says that when we are just considering one objective, a fact
can provide a reason for some action, or a reason against it, but not both for and
against it. We should admit that this principle is extremely intuitively plausible.
Nevertheless, I’ll argue that it doesn’t ultimately undermine Minimal Probabilistic
Promotion.
If there are no background conditions—no facts which enable a fact to be a
reason, without themselves being part of that reason—then Minimal Probabilism
doesn’t violate Restricted Exclusivity. Though the same objective or outcome o
explains both a reason for me to A3 and a reason for me not to A3, the ‘r’ in
question varies. There is not one fact that is a reason with both valences.
The complete reason for A3 is at least that p(D|A3) = 0.1 but p(D|A5) = 0.01;
the complete reason against A3 is at least that p(D|A3) = 0.1 but p(D|A1) = 0.7.
So both the reasons for and against A3 include the fact that p(D|A3) = 0.1, but in
each reason that fact is conjoined with another fact. Alone, p(D|A3) = 0.1 is not a
reason both for and against A3 with respect to my objective or outcome, and so
doesn’t violate Restricted Exclusivity.
More trouble lurks if we suppose that there can be background conditions.18
It’s of course clear that the same fact r can be a reason both for and against A
relative to different sets of background conditions. But the trouble for Minimal
Probabilism lies in a more restricted version of the Restricted Exclusivity:
Doubly Restricted Exclusivity. For all facts r, agents s, actions A, objec-
tives o, and sets of background conditions Z, o cannot explain both why r
is a reason for s to A with background Z, and why r is a reason for s not
to A with background Z.
Here’s why Minimal Probabilism violates Doubly Restricted Exclusivity. If the
facts that p(D|A1) = 0.7 and p(D|A5) = 0.01 are in the set of background condi-
tions, then the view says that p(D|A3) = 0.1 is a reason both for and against A3
relative to that set.
17. Since I’m here concerned with promotional reasons, the objective is always that some
outcome obtains, so I’ll use the terms interchangeably where it won’t introduce confusion.
18. I am grateful to Emma Borg and Justin Snedegar for pressing this objection, and for
extensive discussion.
Ergo · vol. 6, no. 34 · 2019
994 · Luke Elson
But I’m going to argue that Doubly Restricted Exclusivity is false. Once we
admit background conditions, the case for the principle looks very thin. To avoid
question-begging, I’ll illustrate this with a case that doesn’t involve (probabilistic)
promotion. Suppose that your only objective is finding strong coffee; the stronger,
the better. The set of background conditions includes the following relevant facts:
{there is very weak coffee from a gas station in the bathroom; there is very strong
espresso in the kitchen}.
Now, consider the fact that there is fairly strong filter coffee in the study.
Could that be—in violation of Doubly Restricted Exclusivity—a reason both for
and against going to the study? I don’t see why not. Suppose that you asked me
for advice about where to go: is going to the study a good idea? I could cite the
presence of fairly strong filter coffee in the study as a reason to go to the study
(relative to the background condition that there is weak coffee in the bathroom),
or I could cite the presence of fairly strong filter coffee in the study as a reason
not to go to the study (relative to the background condition that there is strong
espresso in the kitchen).
Of course, there is some awkwardness here. Because there is only one
objective—getting the strongest coffee possible—it would be strange and irrational
for you to do anything other than go to the kitchen for espresso. You ought to go
to the kitchen. Nobody should deny this verdictive fact. This feature of the cases
will be hard to escape without a move to multiple competing objectives, as in the
charity case.
But here I am concerned with the contributory reasons. The same fact—that
there is fairly strong filter coffee in the study—provides a reason for and against
going to the study, but this reason is ‘enabled’ by different members of the set
of background conditions. That there is fairly strong filter coffee in the study
is a reason to go to the study given that there is weak gas station coffee in the
bathroom; that there is fairly strong filter coffee in the study is a reason against
going to the study given that there is strong espresso in the kitchen.
This, I think, points to the truth in Doubly Restricted Exclusivity. Define
the set of minimal background conditions for a reason r (with a certain valence) as
the smallest possible subset of Z relative to which r remains a reason with that
valence.
In both violations of Doubly Restricted Exclusivity, r is a reason with both
valences, but with a different set of minimal background conditions for each
valence. As a reason for A3, that p(D|A3) = 0.1 has facts about either A4 or A5 in
its minimal background conditions, together with uncontroversial background
facts. (r has two sets of minimal background conditions as a reason to A3:
one which contains A5, and one which contains A4.) As a reason against A3,
that p(D|A3) = 0.1 has facts about either A1 or A2 in its minimal background
conditions, together with uncontroversial background facts. (r has two sets of
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minimal background conditions as a reason against A3: one which contains A1,
and one which contains A2.)
The truth in Doubly Restricted Exclusivity is that r cannot be a reason both for
and against A3 relative to the same set of minimal background conditions. I don’t
have space to argue for this weaker version of Restricted Exclusivity here, but
can’t think of any counter-examples. In any case, arguments for various versions
of Restricted Exclusivity are hard to come by. At the risk of spawning too many
named principles:
Triply Restricted Exclusivity. For all facts r, agents s, actions A, objectives
o, and sets of minimal background conditions Z, o cannot explain both
why r is a reason for s to A with background Z, and why r is a reason for
s not to A with background Z.
A rich set of background conditions may include subsets which enable r to be both
a reason against A, and a reason for A. But a set of minimal background conditions
will not. At least, I think that this is plausible—and doesn’t threaten Minimal
Probabilism.
To sum up. If there are no background conditions for reasons, then Restricted
Exclusivity is plausible but Minimal Probabilism doesn’t violate it. If there are
background conditions, then Minimal Probabilism violates Doubly Restricted
Exclusivity, but that principle is false. Minimal Probabilism doesn’t violate Triply
Restricted Exclusivity, which may be plausible, though I’ve not argued for it.
This section has been largely defensive, so I will add a concessive note: if
one accepts Doubly Restricted Exclusivity, and thinks that there are both reasons
against actions and background conditions for reasons, then this would be—in
the vein of Snedegar—a good reason to reject Minimal Probabilism. The price of
the theory is too high for you. But the other views, including Contrastivism, have
their own high prices.
8. Conclusion
I have argued that Minimal Probablism deals correctly with perennial problem
cases, most importantly Buttons and the three-action cases, and that it thereby
undermines much of the motivation for contrastivism. Both the lack of promotion
in cases of causal impotence and the very cheap reasons could reasonably be cited
as reasons to reject the Minimal Probabilism. But I have argued that these are
features that a probabilist should live with, or even embrace.
So where are we? There are four candidate views remaining, if one accepts
that disposition-sensitivity and the fit account are just too implausible. These
are Do Nothing, Ranking Probabilism (without a baseline), Contrastivism, and
Minimal Probabilism.
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You might be surprised to see Do Nothing on this list. But we now have the
tools to make a more spirited defence of that baseline. The distinction between the
contributory and the verdictive, supplemented with dis-promotion and associated
reasons against actions, allows us to say that though there is never a reason to
do nothing, there can often be most reason to do nothing. This is a contributory
oddity, but perhaps an acceptable one—especially as a regimentation of our
everyday talk of promotion. A claim that one promotes an outcome by doing
nothing does stick in the throat a little; it’s much more natural to say that one
simply fails to dis-promote the outcome, as Do Nothing has it.
This addition to Do Nothing highlights an ambiguity or underspecification
in the slogan that a reason is a consideration which counts in favour of some
action: counts in favour as opposed to what? Finlay’s counterfactual baseline says:
as opposed to not doing it. Do Nothing says: as opposed to doing nothing. I have
defended Minimal Probabilism: as opposed to something else you could do.
However, I think that Do Nothing is ultimately indefensible as a normative
theory of promotion, as implicitly defined by Absolute Reason-Promote and
Degree Reason-Promote. Minimal Probabilism has some quirks, to be sure, but
these are systematic and not quite so damaging as they may first appear. To return
to the financial case, it’s overwhelmingly intuitive that there is a reason against
A4. Minimal Probabilism simply adds that there is also a reason for A4. Any
residual implausibility should be set against the fact that Minimal Probabilism
correctly deals with Buttons, and avoids disposition-sensitivity, contrastivism,
and three-action problems.
So ends my defence of Minimal Probabilism. We’ve seen that the relatively
tricky and apparently niche issue of promotion has substantive implications
for the theory of reasons. For example, one longstanding debate about reasons
concerns their cheapness. It’s a worry for Humeanism that it produces ‘too many
reasons’, as Schroeder (2007: Ch. 5) puts it.19 Minimal Probabilism implies that
promotional reasons are very cheap indeed, for the Humean and for everyone else.
There are many more practical reasons than most of us suspected (as the financial
example shows), and this mitigates cheapness as a worry for Humeanism. We can
no longer say that by abandoning some versions of Humeanism we remove the
problem of cheap reasons, unless we also adopt a different account of promotion.
One might think the promotion debate trivial because of how recent it all
is. Isn’t it just a relatively niche philosophical fashion? But there are good
philosophical reasons for promotion’s recent rise to prominence. Famously, as
Scanlon (2014: 1) notes, ‘reason’-talk has only been common (in meta-ethics at
least) in the last few decades, replacing much talk of duties, obligations, and
rightness.
19. As Evers (2009) makes clear, the cheapness of reasons is crucial to Schroeder’s project
of vindicating agent-neutral reasons.
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Whereas obligations and duties concern which actions are required or op-
timal in a given situation, reasons—especially promotional reasons—naturally
lend themselves to more scalar discussions, and to a concern for the degree of
normative support that sub-optimal actions have. We talk not of actions that are
obligatory and non-obligatory, but of those which are supported by stronger and
weaker reasons. So the reasons programme in ethics naturally leads to a focus on
the question of promotion. Granted, the promotion debate tends to use toy cases
such as Buttons. But if the reasons programme fails in simple cases involving a
single outcome, then that’s not promising. I’ve argued that it doesn’t fail. The
best theory of promotion has some counterintuitive implications—but ones we
can live with.
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